Introduction
Aristotle starts Parts of Animals, II.10 by addressing the necessary parts of all complete animals and then, representing the living world on a scale ranging from plants to mankind, he says:
It is, then, of the nature of plants, being immobile, not to have many forms of the non-uniform parts; for few actions [πράξεις] require the use of few instruments. Accordingly, we should study the visible character of plants independently. But those [living beings] that have, in addition to life, sensation, are more polymorphic in visible character and some of these more than others. And there is still greater variety among those whose nature partakes not only of living but, in addition, of living well. Such is mankind; for of the animals known to us, either mankind alone, or mankind most of all, partakes of the divine (655b37-656a8, slightly modified). 1 In the above passage, we read Aristotle as considering the possibility of a certain participation in living well by animals other than man. This does not come as a complete surprise for students of Aristotelian biology, since-throughout his biological treatisesAristotle frequently uses the distinction between parts or traits that animals possess necessarily, on the one hand, and those, on the other, which exist for the sake of some good purpose.
2 There is, however, another crucial and particular point in this passage: it elliptically suggests the existence of certain animals whose nature partakes only of living. Commentators seem to neglect this aspect of the passage 3 and the question of which creatures can be said to "partake only of living" despite their capacity for sensation. The answer seems obvious: those animals would be the most primitive and the least complex ones. Agreed, but which ones?
Above all, why those? The present paper offers a partial answer to these questions and it sets out to explore one strict biological sense in which an animal can be said to live merely in
Aristotle's biology.
The argument defended in sections 1-4 of the paper is the following. Aristotle thinks that some animals "merely live," just like plants. He defines merely living as living a life confined to nutritive activities. This is one strict biological sense in which an animal can be said to live merely in Aristotelian biology. Thus, animals that are confined to lives consisting of nutritive actions would also be said to merely live. However, their being confined to nutritive life cannot be due to their possessing nothing more than nutritive soul, because such an animal does not exist for Aristotle. Since their being confined to nutritive life cannot be explained by being confined to nutritive soul, the next best explanation views them as living a perceptive form of nutritive life; and the best way of doing this is to show the nutritive character of their perceptive natures. It will be argued that the perceptive nature of these animals is so rudimentary that it makes their actions hardly different from a plant's. In other words, it is with regard to their perceptive nature that these animals are plant-like. An examination of the nature of the sense of touch closes this argument. Section 5 is devoted to exploring this thesis in the cases of specific types of sea creatures.
I. Not only alive, but animal
To address the question of what a "merely living animal" would be for Aristotle, it is
helpful to determine what it means for him to say of something that it has life, in the simplest sense of the term. De Anima seems to provide a straightforward answer to this question.
According to Aristotle, the principle in virtue of which life belongs to all living beings is the nutritive soul (II.2, 413b1-2), which originates and causes activities shared by all living things. The form of life for which it is responsible is, then, the most basic. The nutritive soul and its peculiar activities constitute the very threshold between inanimate and animate nature, since it is both the necessary and the sufficient condition for something to be considered alive. 4 Nutrition, reproduction, and growth are the nutritive capacity's peculiar activities. 14 While it is true that lack of locomotion is an immediate consequence of growing attached, these two traits are to be distinguished from one another.
Growing attached, these creatures are like plants, less because they cannot move, than because it marks the same frontier for them, as for plants, between life and death: once detached, they die. Further, the first two traits-growing attached and remaining stationaryare not necessarily correlated with the last two-lacking signs of sensation and engaging in mere growth-since Aristotle explicitly recognizes sensation for certain fixed animals. 15 The second set of traits has more bearing on the question whether these creatures are animals or plants because they transform the question into one of definition, calling the capacity of sensation-and thus animality-into question as such. This is not necessarily the case with the first two traits because they do not define an animal as an animal. If the alternative, προιούσης, is pursued, then it becomes a matter of gradually advancing sensation, within a group of creatures already endowed with sensation. Seen this way, the issue will be pointing out the range of differentiation between animals, with regard to sensation, from its most rudimentary form to its most advanced. I take this reading to be correct, since it fits better with Aristotle's psychology. Yet, this alternative only works if we allow for perceptive beings that have nothing but nutrition and growth as their living activities. Such creatures would be plantlike, insofar as they do nothing more than what 18 For a critical apparatus of this line, see Balme (1991, 64 n.2), and his translation note on the opposite page (note e). For relevant information about the manuscript tradition, see his Introduction (1991, . 19 I take "πάντων" to refer, not to all living beings, but to animals only. This seems to be the most natural reading of the phrase because τόκος, with regard to which certain animals' lives are said, in the second half of the sentence, to differ, is animal parturition. Read this way, the entire sentence seems to be designed to make a distinction within one type, namely the animal type of generation. It distinguishes the animals that have no other activity than generation from those whose activity of generation gets highly complex because of their advanced capacity for pleasure. natures must be due to the very nature of their contact senses themselves. For Aristotle, the paradigmatic contact sense is the sense of touch. 21 Touch is the necessary and sufficient condition for being animal; accordingly, it is the only sense common to all animals (DA II.2, 413b1-9). 22 Its necessity for all animals comes from the fact that animals, as opposed to plants, obtain their nourishment unconcocted, from without their own bodies and by their own efforts, 23 and touch serves the conservation of such beings by providing the most basic "awareness" of what is beneficial or inimical to them as nutriments. 24 As an animal's primary and secure access to food, "touch is the sense of nourishment" (DA II.3, 414b7). Touch has this primordial and privileged relation to food because it is perception of the very qualities in tangibles that serve to nourish the animal-namely, dry, moist, hot, and cold (414b7-9).
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Taste, the second tactile sense, is a form of touch because its object, flavor, is tangible. The constitution of flavor can be traced back to, and explained in terms of, the differences touch identifies. Accordingly, a tasteable body, that is, a body with flavor, is a moist body.
Although the dry element has the flavor, it is not tasteable unless it is in a moist state (Sens. 28 Alexander of Aphrodisias reads "τοῦ γευστικοῦ" instead of "τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ." Flavor cannot be an affection of the nutritive part of the soul, he argues, because the nutritive soul is not perceptive (In librum de sensu commentarium 9, 18-10, 11). Ross (1955, 185) takes "τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ" to refer to food, that is, as an equivalent of τρόφιμος, as at Sens. 4, 441b24. I follow Ross here.
Journal 29 DA II.3, 416b11-13. See also GC I.5, 322a17-28 and GA I.6, 744b32-36. 30 Sens. 4, 441b23-442a12. 31 To this list, we may add holothurians and sea lungs, which are described as being unattached yet motionless, and as animals deprived of perception (PA IV.5, 681a16-26; for the holothuria as I start with sponges because the question of animality for them is the subject of the most ambiguous remarks in the corpus. In the same HA passage (588b10-27), Aristotle describes sponges as resembling plants in every respect (παντελῶς). His incredulousness about the animality of sponges has an almost verbatim doublet at PA IV.5, 681a15-17.
These two passages seem, however, to be in contradiction with HA I.1, 487b6-12, where Aristotle says:
Moreover, some animals are stationary; others are mobile. The stationary ones live in water; none of the land animals is fixed. In water, many animals live attached, for example, many kinds of hard-shelled creatures. And the sponge also seems to have a certain sensation. Its sign is that it is more difficult to tear it off if the movement is not made secretly-or so it is said.
This passage has a doublet at HA V.16, 548b10-12. Besides, at 549a7 (in the same chapter), Aristotle seems to give his consent to a "plain agreement" among men on the perceptive nature of one species of sponge called "the unwashable."
Although these passages appear to contradict each other, 32 I tend to think Aristotle's standard view is represented by those passages that recognize sensation in sponges, whereas he makes those comments that seem to deny it for rhetorical value.
Aristotle's interest in sponges was led, less by the question of knowing whether they were perceptive, than by the frailness of their animality in all respects. However, frail or not, in order to be acknowledged as animals, sponges had to pass the test of sensation. The above passage from HA (I.1, 487b6-12) is a good example: Aristotle dogmatically appeals to sensation to justify classifying sponges as animals. 33 Appearing in an introductory chapter, in which Aristotle sketches the program for the entire book, this passage provides an example of one of many zoological differences to be investigated throughout the book. Sponges are an example of stationary water animals. So, their animality is not of special concern here. However, the sponge is such a creature that, in order to view it as a certain kind of animal, one must first show good reason to view it as an animal at all. Thus, Aristotle initially gives motionless see also HA I.1, 487b15). They are compared to some plants that are able to live unattached. To explain these creatures, Lloyd (1996, 80-82) suggests that Aristotle was not dogmatic about perception as the criterion of animality. Far from solving the difficulty, his suggestion doubles it: if we accept these creatures as animals-despite their lack of perception-we also need to explain why the unattached plants, to which they are compared, are not equally animals. Rather than giving up one of the most fundamental principles of Aristotle's psychology, I would prefer a chronological explanation about the development of his thought. Until then, I take Aristotle to contradict himself. 32 According to David Balme, Aristotle would have learned about the perceptiveness of sponges after he wrote the passages denying it (1991, 23 and 64 note b). Lloyd (1996, 75 note 9) is critical of Balme's suggestion. See also Lennox (2001b, 301) . 33 This passage provides a good counterexample to Lloyd's suggestion that Aristotle was not dogmatic about perception as the criterion of animality. credit to the story about sponges contracting when approached, since it is a sign of perceptivity.
On the other hand, the passages that seem to deny sensation to sponges support the idea that these creatures would be less interesting as plants than as frail animals for Aristotle.
He wants sponges to be animals, but he likes them to be so in a weak way. First of all, neither All sponges grow either attached to rocks or on sea beaches and they feed on slime. Its sign is that, when they are caught, they appear to be full of slime. This is also characteristic of other living beings that get their nourishment from their points of attachment (HA V.16, 548b5-548b8).
Sponges are attached to rocks or to beaches by the lower parts of their bodies, which are covered by a sort of membrane (548b32). The fact that sponges are found to be full of slime when torn off suggests that they take their nourishment inside their bodies. As a consequence, their "roots" (548b17) do not serve for reaching and getting an already 34 See Lloyd (1996, 67 and 73-74 concocted food from slime, unlike plants. 35 Aristotle seems to mean that the rootlike parts of their bodies are used for absorbing slime through the points at which they attach to the ground. He suggests, then, that the perceptive activity of sponges is limited to discriminating and appropriating nourishment by the intermediary of touch. They use sensation as a function of their global nutritive activities, but this does not make their bodies more structured than plants' bodies. Since their food is not concocted beforehand, sponges must be classified together with creatures that obtain their food in a raw state, by their own efforts, and from outside their bodies: animals.
However, this interpretation is challenged at HA V.16, 548b12-15. By the end of the passage, where he reports the contraction of sponges when approached by hands, Aristotle remarks:
It makes (ποιεῖ) the same thing in windy weather and wavy sea for not being plucked off (πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀποπίπτειν). But some people do not agree with this, as, for instance, the people of Torone.
The first part of this sentence is marked with overtly teleological language: sponges are said to make (ποιεῖ) the contracting movement for (πρὸς) tightening their hold. 36 This use of touch is already doing something else and more than mere immediate nutrition.
Yet, Aristotle feels the need to note Toronean reservations on this issue. I can see no good reason to suppose that Aristotle would have taken the word of Toroneans less seriously than that of sponge divers for the perceptiveness of sponges. So, when Aristotle cites the Toronean disagreement about sponge behaviors in a tumultuous sea, I take him to acknowledge and note it as testimony to the existence of at least one kind of sponge that does not contract in order to tighten its hold and does not, therefore, use touch for a purpose beyond immediate nutrition.
In the same chapter of the History of Animals, Aristotle first divides sponges into two comprehensive groups, loose-textured (μανός) 37 and close-textured (πυκνός), 38 and then 35 For a comparison between the digestive systems of plants and animals, see PA II.3, 650a2-32. See also Juv. 1, 468a4-12. 36 The use of πρὸς, instead of the more usual and technical ἕνεκα, for finality to discuss sponge contraction during stormy weather suggests that the teleology involved in this use of touch is a weaker kind, in the sense that it is not necessitated by the animal's formal nature. For this usage of πρὸς by Aristotle and its relation to animal living well, see Leunissen (2010, 20 and 96) and Lennox (2001b, 291) . 37 HA V.16, 548b1 and b19. Useful information about the naming and divisions of marine invertebrates can be found in Voultsiadou and Vafidis (2007) . 38 HA V.16, 548b1, b9, b20, and b25.
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mentions a third species called Achilleios. 39 He identifies two species of the close-textured group, ἀπλυσίας 40 and τράγος. 41 Loose-textured sponges are said to be stronger than closetextured sponges because the latter's attachment extends over a smaller area. So, we may suppose that loose-textured sponges and the Achilles, which is said to be "exceptionally strong," would not need to tighten their holds because they are already strong. The τράγος (goat) is particularly hard and rough, says Aristotle, which implies that they live in windy and stormy regions because, as Aristotle suggests, such weather conditions tend to harden sponges. Thus, those sponges in the Hellespont are hard and rough. From this information, we may deduce that "goats," being less strong than loose-textured large sponges, do tighten their holds. In reference to the testimony of Toroneans, it is not surprising that the calmer sea of the Toronean harbor hosts the non-tightening species. In his collection of proverbs, Zenobius says that, because it is separated from the sea by two narrow passages, the sound of the sea was never heard in the harbor. This, according to Zenobius, is the origin of the proverb: "Deafer than the port of Torone" (κωφότερος τοῦ Τορωναίου λιμένος). 42 So, it is most probable that the sponges of Torone harbor were not "goats," which explains why they would not behave like them and would not use their bodies and touch for tightening their holds. This conclusion may have more of an evolutionary spin than we would expect from 
b. Sea anemones
Aristotle's account of sea anemones (ἀκαλήφη or κνίδη) is more cohesive than that of sponges. He distinguishes two kinds, the edible (ἀκαλήφη ἐδώδιμος) and the hard (ἀκαλήφη σκληρός). 43 According to Aristotle's description, their common features are: 44 they are perceptive; they have no shells, but their entire bodies are fleshy; they attach themselves to rocks; they have mouths at the center of their bodies and feed by seizing upon and clinging to their prey; and they have no excretion. 45 The fundamental difference between them is significant for our purposes: the edible kind uses touch to loosen and reattach itself, whereas the hard kind, ἀκαλήφη σκληρός, "never loosens its hold upon the rocks," and seems to use touch-besides its discriminative function-to seize upon and cling to edible things that fall upon it. 46 Although this creature has a "mouth" for taking food into its body, its digestive system seems so simple that it produces no residue. 47 Compared to sponges, the presence of mouths is already a step forward in morphological complexity. However, in the case of fixed anemones, their morphological complexity does not seem to take them beyond mere living: given the fleshy uniform nature of their entire bodies and the simplicity of their digestive systems, their use of touch for seizing and clinging to prey looks less like hunting than an integrated stage of the nutritional process. That is, the fleshy body itself works as a part of the animal's nutritive system and no more. In this respect, they are like sponges, which seem to use their bodies to absorb their nutriment.
Things are different for ἀκαλήφη ἐδώδιμος, which "detaches itself and changes its place." 48 That this kind loosens and reattaches itself serves three basic goals: it breaks loose during the night to seek food; 49 it uses the rock to which its attaches as a shell for protection; 50 and it changes place according to the seasons, slipping into rock crevices when oppressed by heat. 51 It is evident that this kind of anemone uses touch and its body for several different actions, beyond immediate nutrition.
c. Ascidians
Ascidians are a species of Testacea and have the peculiarity that they are entirely enveloped by their shells. 52 Within this shell, they have a fleshy part, enclosed by a sinewy membrane. They have two passages leading outwards through the shell, and it is through these orifices that they admit and discharge seawater. Ascidians, says Aristotle, have no excretion, other than surplus moisture, and, in this respect, resemble plants. That they can live only if attached to some other object is another of their plantlike features. Nonetheless, Aristotle thinks ascidians are more akin to animals than are sponges because of their fleshy interiors.
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The ascidian does not use its fleshy part to attach itself to rocks, but rather attaches by the shell. The fleshy part, together with the membrane enclosing it, has the function of straining the water it takes in, 54 and this process of percolation makes seawater fresher. Like all other testacea, this is the ascidian's way of nourishment. 55 So, its fleshy part seems to play a role in the process of nutrition. Yet, it is not equally evident that the capacity for touch in the fleshy part is used in the percolation process. One might assume that the sense of touch functions as an absorbing power in percolation. But the wax vessel experiment, described at HA VII (VIII).2, 590a22-26, clearly shows that the percolation by the fleshy part does not necessarily require any power of absorption. The experiment aims at testing the presence of drinkable water in the sea. It consists in making a vessel of wax and putting it in the sea; after a night and day, it fills with drinkable water (τὸ πότιμον). The percolation process filters and separates the earthy salty stuff, so the only water let into the vessel becomes potable. Just as the wax in this experiment, the fleshy part of the ascidian plays no greater part than to filter 51 HA IV.6, 531b16.
52 HA IV.4, 528a18-20. 53 PA I.5, 681a10-35. 54 One fundamental difference between ascidians and sea anemones lies in the fact that, although anemones obtain nourishment in water and cannot live outside water, they take in neither water nor air (HA I.1, 487b25). 55 See PA IV.7, 683b22-23 and HA VII(VIII).2, 590a22. 57 Thus, the ascidian, too, feeds on the sweet water produced by percolation. It is percolation itself that produces the animal's nourishment, insofar as this process is concoction (590a21). 58 However, it does not necessarily follow that the ascidian tastes the sweet produced, since taste in animals takes place before concoction, not afterwards.
At most, we can conclude that, since the ascidian has an observable fleshy part, it must be perceptive; yet, it is not as obvious that it performs any nutritive action by its sensation.
Aristotle himself does not seem to mean any more than that. When he asserts that the ascidian is more akin to animals than the sponge, he does not seem offer a better reason than that its fleshy part may be easily observed. 59 
d. The Pinna and the Razor shell
With the pinna and the razor shell, which are testacea, the threshold of doing more than mere nutrition seems to get crossed for good. This is for three reasons. First, these creatures' fleshy parts are bundles of viscera-like structures. 60 All testacea (except ascidians) have internal parts that Aristotle identifies by the names of parts of blooded animals, either because of their morphological similarity, or on the basis of functional analogy. So, like all other bivalves, the pinna and the razor shell als o have a head, horns, a mouth, a "tongue," a gut, a stomach, and a passage for excretion. Yet, according to Aristotle, viscera and their analogue are non-uniform in shape. 61 So, considered together with their shells, these creatures' entire bodies are differentiated between uniform and non-uniform parts. Compared to the animals already discussed, this is a high level of functional and morphological variation. The second reason follows from the first: with internal organs, these animals' activities, relative to nutrition, become highly complex and mediated. Variation in parts follows from variations in purposes and actions, whence the third reason: the pinna, at least, opens and closes its shell. These two movements have distinct purposes: opening lets seawater in for percolation, 62 while closing protects its fleshy part and preserves its natural heat. 63 Though they are related to nutrition, these two actions are not immediately nutritive.
They introduce, in fact, mediation to the animal's nutritive life.
With such a highly differentiated digestive system, nutrition ceases to be an immediate function of the sense of touch and its bodily part; rather, nutrition becomes mediated by different actions, performed by internal parts and moving shells. One might object that, in the case of ascidians as well, touch seems to have no direct nutritive function.
But, there seems to be no good reason to suppose the ascidian's body is more structured than a plant's: the teleological relation between a shell protecting the inner fleshy part does not seem to be more "differentiated" than the relation between a plant's leaf and the pericarp.
However, this objection may help us develop further precision about merely living animals:
what makes these animals merely alive is not only that they live a simple life confined to nutritive activities (despite their perceptive natures), but also that they live it in the most simple and the most immediate way possible for an animal.
A clearer glimpse of the distinction between merely living and its beyond in the case of these most primitive sea creatures can be gained, if we consider the sea urchin, which is also a testacean (PA IV.5, 680a24-681a2). The urchin has "eggs" in its body. 64 The animal's body is so arranged that, to each of its five segments are distributed five "eggs," five teeth, and five stomach compartments. Five is the necessary number of "eggs" because, if there were fewer, it "would not serve a good purpose" (τὸ μὲν οὐ βέλτιον, 680b26) because fewer than five segments of its body would benefit from their protective function. 65 More than five is impossible, says Aristotle, because, in that case, they would be quite continuous, which would be against the common nature of the class of hard-shelled animals to which the urchin belongs. The same idea of a balanced arrangement explains the compartmental structure of the stomach, which is also divided into five:
Otherwise, if the stomach were one, the eggs would either be distant from it, or it would occupy the entire cavity, which would make it difficult for the sea urchin to move about and to find sufficient food to fill the cavity. But as it is, there are five eggs separated by five intervals, and so there must be five departments of the stomach, one for each interval (680b31-35).
The way the urchin's body is arranged is not only good for its protection, but also best for its moving capacity. On the other hand, the quality of its moving capacity contributes to its feeding. Compared to the life of a sponge, the life of a sea urchin deserves to be regarded as a success story, which could have turned out otherwise, as Aristotle implies.
Conclusion
I set out to explore the nature of those animals to which Aristotle tacitly refers at PA II.10, 655b38-656a8 as "partaking only of living". I concluded that it is possible to make sense of this distinction if we consider that some of animals, which are solely endowed with contact senses, do nothing more than nutrition by their sensation. Though they are perceptive, the praxeis of their lives are confined to mere immediate nutrition. These animals seem to only live due to the immediacy of the very few actions of which they are capable. Even their perceptive activities are barely distinguishable from nutrition. The absence of signs of perception in some of these animals can be understood this way. I claimed that this conclusion follows, if we consider the nutritive functions of the contact senses. On the Aristotelian scala naturae, the mere nutritive use of the sense of touch determines a threshold beyond which certain animal species do never go. The difference marked by this threshold has been partially illustrated by the examples of sponges tightening their holds in stormy weather, sea anemones loosening their holds to seek food, and the interdependence between the inner bodily organization and capacities for moving and nutrition in sea urchins.
